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Civil Liability For Furnishing Liquor
In California
California law concerning liability of a commercial supplier of
alcoholic beverages has recently undergone a major change. The
old rule of non-liability was abrogated by Vesely v. Sager in which
the court found a "duty" based on statutes which do not neces-
sarily provide for civil liability. This comment attempts to ana-
lyze the impact of the case with respect to two related issues which
remain unanswered. First, is there potential civil liability of a
noncommercial supplier to injured third persons? Secondly, can
either a commercial or noncommercial supplier of alcohol become
civilly liable to the person served when he subsequently injures
himself? Finally, the author proposes legislation to resolve these
questions.
Prior to 1971, California courts were unanimous in holding that
a liquor vendor could not be held liable for injuries received by a
third person as a result of the vendor serving an intoxicated patron.
In 1971, the California Supreme Court abrogated this time-honored
rule in the case of Vesely v. Sager,' and in so doing, prompted legis-
lative action which sought to codify this decision.2 The case and
the attempted legislation have raised two significant issues which this
comment will attempt to resolve:
First, can a noncommercial supplier of alcoholic beverages be sub-
jected to civil liability as a result of his serving an intoxicated person
who subsequently injuries a third person?
Secondly, can either a commercial or noncommercial supplier of
alcoholic beverages be subjected to civil liability as a result of serving
an intoxicated person who subsequently injures himself?
In order to address these issues the scope of this comment will
include an analysis of the general law of nonliability prior to 1971,
the impact of Vesely v. Sager, legislative reaction in Assembly Bill
1864, and possible judicial extension without a legislative mandate.
1. 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
2. A.B. 1864, 1972 Regular Session, §1.
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PRE-1971 RULE OF NONLIABILITY
California court decisions finding no liability of a liquor supplier
for serving an intoxicated person were based upon common law princi-
ples prevalent throughout the United States.3 Although the issue was
not presented in the case, dictum in Lammers v. Pacific Electric Rail-
way4 adopted the common law rule for California, which was continu-
ously followed until Vesely. The Lammers' court stated, "[]t has
been uniformly held in the absence of a statute to the contrary that
the sale of intoxicating liquor is not the proximate cause of injuries
subsequently received by the purchaser because of his intoxication." 5
No reasoning or other analysis was given for the proposition, only
the determination that this was the common law and it was binding
on the courts until the legislature saw fit to change it. It was no
surprise, therefore, that the first major California case presenting the
issue of liability of a liquor supplier was disposed of by a statement
that "the proximate cause is not the wrongful sale of liquor but the
drinking of the liquor so purchased."6
Two additional California cases ruling upon liability of a liquor
supplier, Fleckner v. Dionne7 and Cole v. Rush,8 also adopted the
view that the consumption of intoxicating liquors, and not their sale,
was the proximate cause of any injuries subsequently received. Again,
this was an adoption of the common law rule without further discus-
sion or justification.
The California-adopted common law rule of nonliability was also
followed by other jurisdictions not having statutory enactments to the
contrary.9 In 1959, however, there was a deviation from this rule
in two states that had not provided for statutory liability. The first
of these cases, Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store,10 arose
from the following factual situation. Certain defendants, who were
engaged in the business of selling intoxicating liquor in Illinois, sold
such liquor to the owner and the driver of an automobile involved
3. See Tarwater v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746 (1940);
Hyba v. C.A. Homeman, Inc., 302 I1. App. 143, 23 N.E.2d 564 (1939).
4. 186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523 (1921).
5. Id. at 384, 199 P. at 525.
6. Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 809, 143 P.2d 952, 955 (1943).
7. 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
8. 45 Cal. 2d 345, 189 P.2d 450 (1955).
9. See generally, Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833 (1961); Annot., 130 A.L.R. 352
(1941); 45 AM. JUR. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors §553 et seq. (1969); 48 C.J.S., Intoxi-
cating Liquors §430 (1947). Those states not having dram shop acts include: Alas.,
Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mass.,
Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.H., N.J., N.M., Pa., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va.,
W. Va.; see Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CAL. L. REv.
995, 996 n.6 (1969).
10. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
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in a collision with an automobile in which the plaintiffs were riding.
It was alleged that the owner and the driver of the automobile were
intoxicated and that the plaintiffs' injuries were sustained as a proxi-
mate result of the unlawful acts of the defendants in selling liquor
to the automobile owner and driver while they were intoxicated. The
court determined that due to the site of the accident Michigan common
law was applicable, and that "under the facts appearing in the comp-
plaint the tavern keepers are liable in tort for the damages and in-
juries sustained by the plaintiffs as a proximate result of the unlawful
acts of the former."11  The finding that the tavern keepers' acts were
unlawful was based on an Illinois statute prohibiting the sale of alcoholic
beverages to any intoxicated person.1
2
The Waynick decision was soon followed by Rappaport v. Nichols,"3
a New Jersey case wherein a minor was served intoxicating beverages
in four named taverns. Upon leaving the last tavern while intoxicated,
he negligently drove a motor vehicle and collided with the plaintiff's
automobile, resulting in the death of its driver. The court recognized
that the consumption of the alcoholic beverages superseded any possi-
ble liability of the tavern keeper at common law, but said, "Where
a tavern keeper sells alcoholic beverages to a person who is visibly
intoxicated or to a person whom he knows or should know from the
circumstances to be a minor, he ought to recognize and foresee the
unreasonable risk of harm to others through action of the intoxicated
person or the minor."' 4 Therefore, since the minor's conduct (causing
an accident) was foreseeable, it did not supersede the defendants'
unlawful and consequently negligent act of serving alcoholic beverages
to a minor.
Waynick and Rappaport were the first major decisions in the area
of alcoholic beverage liability which refused to adhere to the common
law rule. It was not until 1971 that California followed this lead
with Vesely.
VESELY V. SAGER
In the Vesely case, defendant Sager operated a mountain-top lodge
and was engaged in the business of selling alcoholic beverages to
the general public. Beginning about 10 p.m. on April 8, 1968, Sager
11. Id. at 326.
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, §131 (Smith-Hurd 1944). This statute is similar to
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25602 which was used to establish a duty of care in
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). See text
accompanying notes 16-24 infra.
13. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
14. Id. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8.
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served defendant O'Connell large quantities of alcoholic beverages.
At the time Sager knew that the only route leaving the lodge was
a very steep, winding, narrow mountain road. Nevertheless, Sager
continued to serve O'Connell alcoholic drinks until 5:15 a.m. on April
9. After leaving the lodge, O'Connell drove down the road, veered
into the opposite lane, and struck plaintiff's vehicle.15
The court began its opinion with a survey of prior California cases
which had held that proximate cause was absent because it was the
act of consuming and not the act of selling the liquor that had pro-
duced the injuries claimed.' 6 Notice was then taken of Waynick and
Rappaport which had found proximate cause under similar circum-
stances because the defendants' acts of selling were a substantial factor
and the patron's intervening drunkenness was a foreseeable and normal
risk created by the defendant.' 7  The Vesely court specifically adopted
this reasoning when it said that "an actor may be liable if his negli-
gence is a substantial factor in causing an injury, and he is not relieved
of liability because of the intervening act of a third person if such act
was reasonably foreseeable at the time of his negligent conduct.""' Un-
der this principle of proximate cause the court then went on to find
that "the consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing
conduct are foreseeable intervening causes. ... "I'
With the proximate cause problem finally laid to rest, the court fo-
cused on the question of duty. The court asked, "Did defendant Sager
owe a duty of care to plaintiff or to a class of persons of which he
is a member?" 0  In answering this question the court found that a
duty of care and its attendant standard of conduct required of a rea-
sonable man may be found in a legislative enactment which does not
provide for civil liability. A presumption of negligence will arise from
such statute if it was enacted to protect a class of persons of which
the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm which the plaintiff
suffered as a result of the violation of the statute. This presumption
is codified in California Evidence Code Section 669(a) which pro-
vides:
The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: (1)
He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
15. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 157-58, 486 P.2d 151, 154, 95 Cal. Rptr.
623, 626 (1971).
16. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Lammers v.
Pacific Elec. Ry., 186 Cal. 379, 199 P. 523 (1921); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d
246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (1944).
17. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 323, 325-26 (7th Cir.
1959); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959).
18. 5 Cal. 3d at 163, 486 P.2d at 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
19. Id. at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
20. Id.
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(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to a person
or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence
of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was de-
signed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or in-
jury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for
whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
In Vesely the court found that a duty of care was established by
California Business and Professions Code Section 25602 which pro-
vides:
Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, fur-
nished, or given away, any alcoholic beverages to any habitual or
common drunkard or to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
Additionally, the court stated that Section 25602 "was adopted for the
purpose of protecting members of the general public from injuries to
person and damage to property resulting from the excessive use of in-
toxicating liquor ... ." Secondly, the statute was intended to pro-
tect the safety of the people of CaliforniaY.2  Thus Vesely's injuries
resulted from an occurrence which the statute was designed to prevent,
and he was within the class of persons for whose protection the stat-
ute was enacted.
ASSEMBLY BILL 1864, SECTION 1-A RESPONSE TO VESLEY
During the 1972 regular session of the California Legislature, As-
sembly Bill 1864 was introduced by Assemblyman William M.
Ketchum to provide California with a Civil Damage Act. Section 1
of the bill was a broad attempt to codify the Vesely decision by malc-
ing any person licensed under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act li-
able for damages to either a patron or an innocent third person when
certain conditions occur. The conditions were: (1) a sale of any alco-
holic beverage in violation of Business and Professions Code Section
25602 when it is reasonably foreseeable that such person will drive
a motor vehicle while still under the influence and in fact does drive
a motor vehicle; and (2) while so driving a motor vehicle such person
does any act forbidden by law or neglects any duty imposed by law
which act or neglect proximately causes the death or bodily injury of
such person or any other person.
The effect of the bill would have been to make a California liquor
licensee civilly liable for injuries to a patron, third person, or property
21. 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
22. Id.
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as a result of an automobile accident caused by a patron who was
served while intoxicated.
Although the bill was an attempt to codify Vesely, it differed from
the supreme court's holding in several respects. At the outset of the
Vesely opinion the court said, "Since neither issue is presented in the
instant case, we do not decide whether a noncommercial furnisher of
alcoholic beverages may be subject to civil liability under section 25602
or whether a person who is served alcoholic beverages in violation of
the statute may recover for injuries suffered as a result of that viola-
tion."' 23 Therefore, in Vesely, damages were awarded only to a third
person for injuries received. The bill, however, would have allowed
an award to the intoxicated patron who is himself injured as a result
of being served while intoxicated. This extension is justified by a de-
termination that the intoxicated person himself is a member of the pub-
lic intended to be protected by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, 24
of which Section 25602 is a part. Additionally, the bill provided li-
ability only for liquor licensees, and this language may have been found
to preclude a judicial determination of whether common law negligence
principles could be applied to a noncommercial supplier through the
doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 25 Finally, there was
no provision in the bill for liability of the liquor licensee resulting from
means other than the use of a motor vehicle. Vesely, however, did
not limit liability to injuries resulting from the use of a motor vehicle.26
Vesely required only that the conduct of the patron resulting in injury
be foreseeable. It is arguable, however, that the limitation in the
bill was an attempt to focus on the major problem resulting from the
serving of liquor to intoxicated persons-the fact that roughly 35 per
cent of all fatal accidents in California involve a drinking driver.
Since those portions of the bill dealing with civil liability of liquor
licensees did not pass, the present California law affecting the liability
of a noncommercial supplier who furnishes alcohol in violation of Bus-
iness and Professions Code Section 25602, or the liability of either the
23. 5 Cal. 3d at 157, 486 P.2d at 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §23000 et seq. Section 23001 provides that the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is intended to protect the safety, welfare, health,
peace, and morals of the people of California.
25. The mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing. Under this
rule, the enumeration of liability of liquor licensees in A.B. 1864 would preclude the
inclusion of other classes.
26. 5 Cal. 3d at 164, 486 P.2d at 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
27. Although the decision talked in general terms of a duty established by CiL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §25602, the factual situation was limited to injuries resulting from
a motor vehicle. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
28. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, THE CALIFoRNA DRIVER FACT BOOK
Report No. 29 (1970).
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commercial or noncommercial supplier for serving an intoxicated per-
son who subsequently injures himself, remains open to either judicial
or legislative determination. In any case, though, Section 25602 seems
relevant to the making of such a determination since it was utilized
in both Vesely and Assembly Bill 1864.
NONCOMMERCIAL SUPPLIER'S LIABILITY
Business and Professions Code Section 25602 provides that every
person who sells or gives any alcoholic beverage to an obviously in-
toxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor. Therefore, it is arguable
that a noncommercial supplier falls within the purview of Section
25602 and the rationale of Vesely. To determine whether there is
a reasonable basis for such a finding, an analysis of decisions constru-
ing statutes similar to Section 25602 seems helpful. Focus will then
be shifted towards finding liability of the noncommercial supplier
through current judicial concepts not used in Vesely.
Traditionally, in those states having dram shop or civil damage acts
which provide for the recovery from any person giving or selling intox-
icating liquor, courts have not allowed suits against noncommercial
suppliers. The general rule appears to be well established that such
acts were not intended to, and do not, create a cause of action against
one who gives another alcoholic beverages as a mere act of friendship
or social courtesy without pecuniary gain.20 Instead, the civil damage
acts have been construed as providing a right of action only against
those in the business of selling liquor.30 Several reasons for this
narrow construction of the dram shop-civil damage acts have been ad-
vanced.
The plaintiff in Cruse v. Aden31 brought suit under a section of
the Illinois Dram Shop Act3 2 which provides a wife a right of action
against any person who injures her means of support by giving or sell-
ing liquor to any other person. It was contended that the defendant
was liable for damages when plaintiff's husband died in an accident
brought about by liquor being gratuitously furnished to the husband
by defendant. The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant and
noted that the very title of the act indicated that its provisions were
aimed at dram shops and those who were engaged in the liquor traffic.
Thereafter, in Harris v. Hardesty"3 an action was brought to recover
29. Amot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1412, 1413 (1966).
30. Id.
31. 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, §135 (Smith-Hurd 1944).
33. 111 Kan. 291, 207 P. 188 (1922).
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damages for loss of support under a Kansas Dram Shop Act34 employ-
ing the words "selling or giving" intoxicating liquors. The defendant's
demurrer was sustained, the court saying that the term "giving" was
used only to prohibit a subterfuge for sale and not to provide a cause
of action against a noncommercial supplier.
Finally, in a 1970 Michigan case, Behnke v. Pierson,35 an action
was brought to recover for the wrongful death of a motorist whose
automobile was struck by a car driven by defendants' employee who
was returning from a company party at which alcoholic beverages
were served. The court, in a per curiam decision, said that recovery
for injury caused by an intoxicated person is exclusively statutory.36
The dram shop statute made no provision for holding private individ-
uals liable for furnishing intoxicants for social courtesy or hospitality
reasons without pecuniary gain.37
In states not having dram shop acts the same result has been reached
by different reasoning. In California prior to Vesely the courts had
on at least one occasion dealt with the issue of a noncommercial sup-
plier's alleged liability. In Dwan v. Dixon3" the plaintiff was injured
in an automobile accident after being served alcohol in the defendanfs
home. The court found that the Fleckner and Cole cases set forth
the rule in California that the mere furnishing of alcoholic beverages,
even to a person who is known to be intoxicated and is further known
to be the driver of a motor vehicle, gives rise to no tort liability under
California law. 9 The validity of this position is now in doubt, how-
ever, because such rationale was found unsound in Vesely.4"
In an Arkansas case41 the plaintiff sought to hold a commercial sup-
plier liable under an Arkansas penal statute making it a misdemeanor
for any person to sell or give away liquor to one who is intoxicated.4"
The court said that "b]y its terms . . . [the statute] is equally appli-
cable to a liquor dealer and to a host who serves cocktails in his own
home. ' 43  For this reason the court refused to use the statute as estab-
lishing negligence per se and held the commercial supplier not liable
because it was not prepared to impose liability on the social host.
34. KAN. GEN. SrAT. §5507 (1915), repealed, KAN. L. 1949, c. 242, §115.
35. 21 Mich. App. 219, 175 N.W.2d 303 (1970).
36. MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §436.22 (1967).
37. 21 Mich. App. at 221, 175 N.W.2d at 304.
38. 216 Cal. App. 2d 260, 30 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963).
39. Id. at 264, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
40. See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra.
41. Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965).
42. ARx. STAT. ANN. §48-901 (1964). The provisions of this statute are similar
to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25602.
43. 238 Ark. at 892, 385 S.W.2d at 658.
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In Wisconsin, which has a limited dram shop act, 4 it has been held
that the selling of liquor is too remote to be a proximate cause of an
injury produced by a negligent act of a purchaser in those situations
in which the dram shop act is not applicable. 45 Therefore, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court has said,
[E]xtending liability to the noncommercial vendor would result in
great social pressure being applied to such individuals and require
their policing the activities of friends and social guests. . . . [I]t
is questionable just how much success an individual would have
in playing out his role in the atmosphere of a private gathering.
In addition, such restrictions encompass changes far beyond the
framework of negligence law.
46
These opinions reflected the law of all states, either with or without
dram shop acts, until a few recent decisions have imposed liability
on a noncommercial supplier. In Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor
Co.,47 a March 1972 case, the issue of liability of a noncommer-
cial supplier presented itself to California courts for the first time since
Vesely had allowed recovery from a commercial supplier. The defend-
ant, Kitchen Boyd Motor Company, held a Christmas party at which
it served a minor employee large amounts of liquor. Defendant there-
after placed the minor in his automobile and directed him to drive
the vehicle to his home. While the minor was driving home he struck
the plaintiff's automobile causing injuries for which plaintiff sought to
recover from the employer. The court said that "the Vesely decision
charts the course to be followed in this state."' s It then found that
Section 25658 of the Business and Professions Code which provides
a misdemeanor for every person who sells, furnishes, or gives any alco-
holic beverage to a minor "was adopted and amended by the Cali-
fornia Legislature, presumably because the legislative body believed
that most minors are neither physically nor mentally equipped to han-
dle the consumption of intoxicating liquors. '49  Therefore, "the im-
peccable logic of Vesely implies the conclusion that any person,
whether he is in the business of dispensing alcoholic beverages or not,
44. WIs. STAT. ANN. §176.35 (1957). This section provides for liability of a
commercial supplier for injuries or loss of support as a consequence of the intoxication
of any minor or habitual drunkard if the commercial supplier has been notified or re-
quested in writing pursuant to Section 176.28 to forbid the sale or giving away of
intoxicating liquor to such minor or habitual drunkard. It should be noted that Sec-
tion 176.28, prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages to specified persons on post-
ing of written notice but without either notice or bearing prior to posting, has been
declared unconstitutional on its face as violative of due process. Constantineau v.
Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
45. Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774, 775 (1939).
46. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 734, 176 N.W.2d 566, 570-71 (1970).
47. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
48. Id. at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
49. Id. at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
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who disregards the legislative mandate breaches a duty to anyone who
is injured as a result of the minor's intoxication and for whose benefit
the statute was enacted." 50
In answer to public policy arguments against extending liability to
the social host the court said,
We do not reach the broad question as to whether a host at a so-
cial gathering is subject to liability under Business and Professions
Code Section 25602, for injuries caused by intoxicated guests.
Section 25658 is directed to a special class; it pertains to young
people who because of their tender years and inexperience are
unable to cope with the imbibing of alcoholic beverages.5 1
Later in 1972, two state supreme courts used dram shop acts to
establish the liability of a noncommercial supplier which contrasts with
the California courts' use of a penal statute to establish negligence per
se in Vesely and Brockett. In Williams v. Klemesrud52 the plaintiff,
injured in a vehicle collision, brought an action for damages against
defendant for giving liquor to the driver of the other colliding automo-
bile. Defendant was not engaged in the liquor traffic, but had bought
liquor for the driver who was under twenty-one years old. The court
determined that where a dram shop act provides liability for any person
who sells or gives away liquor to an intoxicated person, individuals
who are not liquor licensees and permitees will be held liable. 3 How-
ever, the decision may no longer be a reflection of Iowa law. The
Iowa Legislature had repealed that portion of the statute making ref-
erence to any person prior to the supreme court decision but after the
case had arisen in trial court. Now liability appears to be limited to
liquor licensees.
Two months after the Iowa decision, and without knowledge of its
existence,5 4 the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the following
situation: Defendants Delmar Ross and Joel Owen Johnson purchased
liquor for Delmar's nineteen-year-old brother, Rodney, which as the
jury found resulted in Rodney's becoming intoxicated. The jury also
found that Rodney's intoxication proximately caused his death when
the car he was driving left the road. Action was brought on behalf
of Rodney's infant son and by Rodney's parents. 55 The court, basing
its decision on Minnesota statutes,5 said that the legislature used the
50. Id.
51. Id. at 93-94, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
52. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
53. Id. at 616.
54. Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149, 153 n.8 (Minn. 1972).
55. Id. at 150.
56. MINN. STAT. ANN. §340.73 (misdemeanor to sell to intoxicated person),
§340.79 (misdemeanor to serve minor), §340.95 (civil damage provision) (1972).
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words any person without limiting application of the statute to liquor
vendorsY" The court stated, "[W]e are persuaded that the purpose
of the act was to impose liability on every violator, whether or not
he was engaged in the liquor business."58 The court then went on
to say that those who furnish liquor to others, even on social occa-
sions, should "be held responsible for protecting innocent third persons
from the potential dangers of indiscriminately furnishing such hospital-
ity.
59
The Klemesrud and Ross decisions did not find the fact that the
individual who was furnished the alcohol was a minor to be signifi-
cant. Therefore, although these decisions were based on the dram
shop acts whichCalifornia does not have, they do make the determini-
nation that equal treatment is available to commercial and noncommer-
cial suppliers when the statute on which liability is based makes refer-
ence to any person.
Since the dram shop act is a different means of finding liability
than that used in Vesely6" and Brockett,8 ' it must be determined if
the Klemesrud and Ross decisions can be used as authority for finding
liability of a noncommercial supplier serving adults in California.
A Minnesota court has construed its dram shop act as having the
principal objective of imposing liability on persons for illegally serving
intoxicating liquors.6 2 This is the same conclusion reached by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Vesely based on application of Business and
Professions Code Section 25602. As previously mentioned, the Vesely
court found that Section 25602 establishes a duty of care, the violation
of which is negligence per se. Section 25602 imposes criminal sanc-
tions on every person who sells, furnishes, or gives any alcoholic bever-
age to an obviously intoxicated person. This would seem to allow Cal-
ifornia to follow the rationale of those cases holding that equal treat-
ment is applicable to both commercial and noncommercial suppliers.
In addition, the Vesely court said,
Our conclusion concerning the legislative purpose in adopting sec-
tion 25602 is compelled by Business and Professions Code section
23001, which states that one of the purposes of the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act is to protect the safety of the people of
this state.
63
57. 200 N.W.2d at 152-53.
58. Id. at 156.
59. Id. at 153.
60. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
61. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr.
752 (1972).
62. Hartwig v. Loyal Order of Moose, 253 Minn. 377, 91 N.W.2d 794 (1958).
63. 5 Cal. 3d at 165, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
1974 / Civil Liability for Furnishing Liquor
Therefore, the harm arising from intoxication through the aid of a non-
commercial supplier is certainly no less than that resulting from the
commercial supplier. The means differ, but the end result is the same.
The Vesely court further stated that if the plaintiff was within
the class of persons for whose protection Section 25602 was enacted,
if the injuries he suffered resulted from an occurrence that the statute
was designed to prevent, if the defendant violated Section 25602, and
if such violation proximately caused plaintiff's injuries, a presumption
will arise that defendant was negligent. 64  It is arguable, therefore,
that proof of such elements in the case of a noncommercial supplier
will impose liability because Section 25602 makes no distinction be-
teen those who sell or furnish for profit and those who do not.
In addition to a finding of liability under Section 25602, liability
may be found under ordinary principles of negligence or by analogy
to the negligent entrustment doctrine. The Oregon Supreme Court
used ordinary negligence principles to find liability of a noncommercial
supplier in Wiener v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity.65 The defendant
fraternity held a party at which alcoholic beverages were served to its
guests including one Blair, a minor. Blair was subsequently involved
in a one-car accident in which the plaintiff, a passenger, was injured.
It was alleged that the fraternity was negligent in knowingly serving
a minor and allowing him to drive an automobile when the fraternity
knew or should have known that there would be an unreasonable risk
of harm resulting from its conduct. The court determined that due
to its limited application, Oregon's Dram Shop Act66 was not available
to the plaintiff under the facts presented. The court also found that
an Oregon penal statute67 which states, "No person other than his par-
ent or guardian shall give or otherwise make available any alcoholic
liquor to a person under the age of 21 years," was not enacted for
the purposes of protecting third persons from injury resulting from
the conduct of inebriated minors or of imposing liability upon a person
contributing to the minor's delinquency by furnishing him with alco-
hol.6 8  Since both statutes were found inapplicable to the facts pre-
64. Id. at 165, 486 P.2d at 159-60, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631-32.
65. 485 P.2d 18 (Ore. 1971).
66. ORE. Rnv. STAT. §30.730 (1971). "Any person who shall bargain, sell,
exchange or give to any intoxicated person or any habitual drunkard spirituous, vinous,
malt or intoxicating liquors shall be liable for all damages resulting in whole or in part
therefrom, in an action brought by the wife, husband, parent or child of such intoxi-
cated person or habitual drunkard. The act of any agent or employee shall be
deemed the act of his principal or employer for the purposes of this section." (empha-
sis added).
67. ORE. REv. STAT. §471.410(c) (1972).
68. 485 P.2d at 21. Cf. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322
(7th Cir. 1959); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
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sented, the court had to decide whether or not a cause of action existed
at common law. The court recognized that under circumstances in
which the host has reason to know that he is dealing with persons
whose characteristics make it especially likely that they will do unrea-
sonable things, the host will have a duty to deny his guests further
access to alcohol.69 In the instant case the fraternity knew that its
guest was a minor who could be expected by virtue of his youth alone
to behave in a dangerous fashion under the influence of alcohol.
70
Therefore, in Oregon a social host may be liable in negligence for serv-
ing a guest alcohol under circumstances in which the unreasonable con-
duct of the guest is foreseeable.
71
A finding of liability by analogy to the negligent entrustment doc-
trine is also relevant. In 1949, Judge Dooling in a dissenting opinion
in Fleckner v. Dionne72 concluded, "[-I]f it is negligence to entrust
an automobile to an intoxicated person or to one addicted to intoxica-
tion why is it not negligence to furnish liquor to a person to the point
of intoxication knowing that he is going to drive an automobile while
in that condition?" As stated, the reasoning is based on decisions that
find the entrustment of an automobile to an intoxicated person is a
negligent act. 73  In addition, it has been said, "Placing intoxicat-
ing liquor in the possession of a child, a drunk or an idiot knowing
that this person intends to drink and drive is to create [a foreseeable,]
unreasonable risk of injury to motorists and pedestrians. .. .
The analogy is not limited to the commercial supplier. In Garcia
v. Hargrove Chief Justice Hallows in his dissenting opinion said:
[T]he majority says if it is logical to hold the commercial dis-
penser liable, then there is no legitimate basis for not also holding
the private dispenser liable; and since it is impractical to hold a
private dispenser liable, we will not hold either. The necessity of
drawing a line of demarcation is a straw-man argument, and I see
no reason why such a distinction must be made. If a person
loans his automobile to a minor incapable of driving or to an in-
toxicated person unable to drive or gives a loaded gun to a minor
who is unable to use it safely, the law has no difficulty in finding
liability. . . . We are still our brothers' keepers, and it would
69. 485 P.2d at 21.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 22.
72. 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 253, 210 P.2d 530, 535 (1949).
73. See Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr.
136 (1968); Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal. App. 957, 212 P.2d 248 (1949); Chaney
v. Duncan, 194 Ark. 1076, 110 S.W.2d 21 (1937); Knight v. Gosselin, 124 Cal. App.
290, 12 P.2d 454 (1932).
74. Johnson, Drunken Driving-The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of
Intoxicating Liquor, 37 IND. L.J. 317, 328 (1962).
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be a rare host at a social gathering who would knowingly give
more liquor to an intoxicated friend when he knows his invitee
must take care of himself on the highway and will potentially en-
danger other persons. Social justice and common sense require
the social host to see within reason that his guests do not partake
of too much of his generosity.
7 5
The use of the negligent entrustment doctrine by Chief Justice Hallows
is similar to the extension of the common law made in Vesely, that
consumption, resulting intoxication, and injury-producing conduct are
foreseeable intervening causes. The reasons for both findings, the pres-
ence of proximate cause and the extension of negligent entrustment,
are at least partially based on the potential dangers created by the
drinking driver.76 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to consider liquor
as a dangerous instrumentality, and such being the case, the applica-
tion of negligent entrustment to the situation is a logical result.
SHOULD THE INTOXICATED CONSUMER RECOVER?
Although the Vesely case did not decide whether the intoxicated
consumer should recover for injuries sustained as a result of being
served while intoxicated, the issue has been presented in two lower
California courts in 1972. In Carlisle v. Kanaywer77 liability was de-
nied when defendants served the decedent while he was intoxicated
and decedent thereafter became violently ill and died in the bar when
he strangled upon inhaling his own vomit. The court held, "[IWf the
concurrent negligence of the plaintiff is a proximate contributing cause
of his injury, his own recovery is barred by his contributory negli-
gence. '" 78 The court appeared to be unconvinced by its own reasoning,
however, and then stated that in light of the supreme court's restraint
in Vesely (declining to comment on the merits of whether one who
is served while intoxicated may recover for his own injuries), "it hardly
befits a lower court to expand the rule in this new and potentially dan-
gerous field."
'79
Thereafter, in Sargent v. Goldberg8" a customer of defendant's li-
quor store, allegedly approaching the state of drunkenness, made a
purchase and then immediately entered a restaurant and met his death
when his head struck the ground while he was being evicted by the
75. 46 Wis. 2d 724, 739-40, 176 N.W.2d 566, 573-74 (1970).
76. SECRETARY OF H.E.W., FiRST SPECIAL REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS ON
ALCOHOL AND HEALTH at 3 (Dec. 1971).
77. 24 Cal. App. 3d 587, 101 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1972).
78. Id. at 591, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
79. Id. at 592, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
80. 25 Cal. App. 3d 940, 102 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1972).
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restaurant owner. The court rested its decision on the fact that dece-
dent was only approaching a state of drunkenness and that there was
no allegation that decedent was obviously intoxicated or a habitual or
common drunkard or that the purchase (presumably from a package
store) in any way contributed to the customer's death.8 In dictum,
however, the court approved the holding in Carlisle saying that
even though not every intervening act breaks the chain of causation
as to an injured third party, application of this rule does not sustain
the right of the injured drinker himself to recover.
8 2
In contrast to these decisions are several cases denying the use of
contributory negligence as a defense. In Schelin v. Goldberg,8 a
Pennsylvania case, it was found that a statute making it unlawful to
sell, furnish, or give away liquor to any person visibly intoxicated"
was enacted to protect society generally, and specifically to protect in-
toxicated persons from their own inability to exercise self-protective
care. 5 In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn8 6 the court used identical rea-
soning when decedent fell and struck his head while a patron in de-
fendant's bar. Plaintiff's contention was that decedent's fall and death
were the result of his having been served liquor by the bartender when
decedent was in an actual and apparent state of intoxication. The court
found,
Intoxication is a state of impairment of one's mental and physical
faculties due to overindulgence in alcoholic drink. A person in
that condition is unable to exercise normal powers of judgment
and prudence. He is a potential menace, not only to himself but
to others. Common sense requires that a tavern keeper refuse to
serve alcoholic drink to such a person. This common law prin-
ciple is carried into our Alcoholic Beverage Control Act which,
through implementing regulations, specifically prohibits a licensee
from serving alcoholic drink to a person actually and apparently
intoxicated. We conclude that plaintiff's complaint sets forth a
justiciable cause of action.8 7
Finally, in Vance v. United States88 the United States District Court
for Alaska held that an Alaska statute 9 prohibiting the sale of liquor
to intoxicated persons and minors was "intended to place the entire
responsibility for resulting harm upon the violator, for it is virtually
81. Id. at 943-44, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
82. Id.
83. 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4493 (1969).
85. 188 Pa. Super. at 348, 146 A.2d at 652.
86. 84 NJ. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (1964).
87. Id. at 375-76, 202 A.2d at 209-10.
88. 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1972).
89. ALASKA STAT. §04.15.020(a) (1962).
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impossible for the statute to be violated without contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff-consumer."9
California Business and Professions Code Section 25602 is similar
to the Pennsylvania statute used in Schelin,9" the New Jersey regula-
tion used in Soronen,92 and the Alaska statute used in Vance,93 and
it is reasonable to contend that it was also enacted to protect the intox-
icated person from his own inability to refuse further drinks. Such
being the case it is arguable that the use of contributory negligence
to bar the patron's recovery is against public policy because the statute,
in theory, was intended to protect against all injuries resulting from
the illegal sale. The Restatement of Torts takes the position: "There
are . . . exceptional statutes which are intended to place the entire
responsibility for the harm which has occurred upon the defend-
ant. A statute may be found to have that purpose particularly where
it is enacted in order to protect a certain class of persons against their
own inability to protect themselves." 94  Illustrative are child labor
acts,95 statutory prohibitions against the sale of firearms to minors,96
and safety acts for the protection of workmen. The analogy of the
Restatement position is easily made to encompass California Business
and Professions Code Section 25602. If it were expected that the pa-
tron could look after his own interests, it would have been made a
misdemeanor to ask for a drink while intoxicated instead of, or in addi-
tion to, placing the responsibility on the supplier.98
CONCLUSION
The imposition of liability on the noncommercial supplier would
seem to be presently available to the California courts under the appli-
cation of California Business and Professions Code Section 25602 and
Evidence Code Section 669 which codifies the presumption of negli-
gence. However, "the standard formulated by a legislative body in
90. 355 F. Supp. at 759-60.
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §4-493 (1969).
92. Regulation 20, Rule 1. Adopted pursuant to NJ. STAT. ANN. §33:1-39
(1940).
93. ALAsKA STAT. §04.15.020(a) (1962).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §483, comment c, at 539 (1965).
95. Pitzer v. M.D. Tomkies & Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951).
96. Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. App. 1959), aff'd, 116
So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959).
97. Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
See also Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 201 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Viola-
tion of a Statute, 32 MINN. L. Rdv. 105, 118-23 (1947).
98. The legislature has prescribed criminal punishment for the minor who pur-
chases alcoholic beverages. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25658. However, the ar-
gument that this does not remove the minor from the class of persons to be protected
is still appropriate due to the recognized protective attitude towards minors.
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a police regulation or criminal statute becomes the standard to deter-mine civil liability only because the court accepts it." 9 Such accept-
ance by the court will depend upon the public policy considerations
that are involved in determining whether the noncommercial supplier
should be held liable for a violation of Section 25602. Some of these
considerations are: (1) the noncommercial supplier's effectiveness in
policing the activities of guests; (2) the ability of the noncommercial
supplier to insure himself against liability; and (3) the costs that the
noncommercial supplier will incur as a result of an extension of liabil-
ity. Although the answers to these questions are beyond the scope
of this comment, the California Legislature should take affirmative ac-
tion to resolve the ambiguity resulting from the use of the words every
person in Section 25602. In the absence of such action by the legis-
lature, courts will be free to resolve the problem by weighing the public
policy arguments against the utility of holding the noncommercial sup-
plier liable.
Additionally, a finding that contributory negligence is not available
as a defense to the patron's recovery for his own injuries is easily made
when the realities of the intoxicated person's ability to exercise self-
protective care are considered. In California Penal Code Section 647,
subsection (f), the legislature categorizes as "disorderly" a person who
is in such a condition that he is unable to exercise care for his own
safety. In a 1971 amendment to Section 647, subsection (ff), the
legislature provided that a person arrested under subsection (f) "shall
be taken to a facility, designated pursuant to section 5170 of the Wel-
fare and Institutions Code, for the 72-hour treatment and evaluation
of inebriates." This amendment is some evidence of the legislature's
protective attitude toward intoxicated persons which could result in a
finding that contributory negligence is not a valid defense to the pa-
tron's recovery.
Since Assembly Bill 1864 met a fatal end, the following proposed
legislation is offered to resolve the questions left unanswered by
Vesely:
Any person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold,
furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any person,
when a reasonable man would believe such person to be either
intoxicated or to be a minor, is civilly liable for any damages aris-
ing out of the death or bodily injury of such person or any other
person and any property damage if the person to whom the al-
coholic beverage was sold, furnished, or given does any act for-
99. Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 73, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943).
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bidden by law or neglects any duty imposed by law which act or
neglect proximately causes the death or bodily injury of such
person or any other person or such property damage.
Although this proposal may meet the same fate as did Assembly
Bill 1864, it should be remembered that the courts have the power
to reach the same result, and indeed many have, through the applica-
tion of current legal principles.
Ronald W. Collett

